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FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE MENTALLY DISORDERED:
PHILOSOPHICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES
Lawrence 0. Gostin*
In the serene world of mental illness, modern man no longer communicates
with the madman: on one hand, the man of reason delegates the physician
to madness, thereby authorizing a relation only through the abstract uni-
versality of disease; on the other, the man of madness communicates with
society only by the intermediary of an equally abstract reason which is order,
physical and moral constraint, the anonymous pressure of the group, the
requirements of conformity.
Michel Foucault, Madness & Civilization
I. Introduction
Mental illness is usually described as an impaired ability to communicate
effectively.' Yet the societal response-both historically' and under modem
psychiatric practice--has been to retard, rather than encourage, the acquisition
* Fulbright-Hays Fellow, Social Research Unit, Bedford College, University of London.
B.A., State University of New York at Brockport, 1971; J.D., Duke University School of Law,
1974.
1 iUdz, The Family, Language, and the Transmission of Schizophrenia in THE TRANS-
MISSION OF SCHIZOPHRENIA 175, 17784 (D. Rosenthal & S. Kety ed. 1968); Salzinger,
Portnov & Feldman, Verbal Behavior in Schizophrenia, in PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF SCHIZO-
PHRENIA 98 (P. Hoch & J. Zubin eds. 1966); H. SULLIVAN, SCHIZOPHRENIA AS A HUMAN PRO-
cEss 27-28 (1962); J. RuEscH, THERAPEUTIC COMMUNICATION 371 (1961); Birdwhistell,
Contribution of Linguistic-Kinesic Studies to the Understanding of Schizophrenia in SCHIZO-
PHRENIA - AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 99-123 (A. Auerbach ed. 1959); R. BRowN, WORDS
AND THINGS 292-98 (1958); J. RUESCH, DISTURBED COMIUNICATION 43 (1957); Sullivan,
The Language of Schizophrenia in SCHIZOPHRENrA 4-16 (J. Kasanin ed. 1939).
2 The societal response to madness has traditionally been to isolate and remove the
deviant elements from the community. In the sixteenth century, buildings which originally
housed lepers became the homes of "incurables and madmen." During the Renaissance, the
response was "Stultifera Navis" or "Ship of Fools"; madmen were sent floating out along
the serene waves of the Rhineland and the Flemish canals. However archaic these practices
might seem to the modem psychiatrist, boats were often set to sail with the most benign of
purposes. "Interest in cure and in exclusion coincide." M. FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVI-
LIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE AGE OF REASON 10 (1965). See also D. TUKE,
HISTORY OF THE INSANE IN THE BRITISH ISLES (1882).
3 In the United States, modem psychiatry institutionalizes nearly half a million persons
each year. Note, Application of the Fifth Amendment Privileges against Self-Incrimination to
the Civil Commitment Proceeding, 1973 DuKE L. J. 729. The number of commitments into
mental institutions has been gradually increasing. Developments, Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill, 87 H~Av. L. REV. 1190, 1403 n.19 (1974). The all-encompassing, total charac-
ter of the institution, characterized by its physical distance from population centers, discourages
normal social intercourse with the outside world. See E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON
THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES 4, 7 (1961).
Further, there are the incorporeal barriers to the acquisition of linguistic skills due to the
stigma which attaches to the resident upon his entrance into a mental institution. See notes
37-39 infra and accompanying iext.
Finally, there are the more direct disincentives to the acquisition of communicative skills
in the form of restraints on rights to use postal and telephone services, to consult with legal
counsel, to interact with the opposite sex, and to make and receive visits. V. VCTOROFF & H.
RoSs, HOSPITALIZING THE MENTALLY ILL IN OHIO 143 (1969); Brief for National Center
for Law and the Handicapped as Amicus Curiae at 18, Horacek v. Exon, - F. Supp. - (D.
Neb. 1974):
All her [named plaintiff] outgoing mail is censored. The letters she sends to her
sister have portions inked out by Beatrice officials. All her incoming mail is opened
prior to her receiving it.
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of linguistic skills. This impediment to normal social intercourse leaves individual
interests in free expression ineffectuated; it concerns the legal profession because
the government condones and enforces the restriction of first amendment rights
in a potentially large segment of the population.' This article will examine the
philosophical justification for free communication for the mentally handicapped.
It will further suggest a systematic application of the first amendment to the
particular problems of the mentally defective.
II. Philosophical Perspectives
Under traditional theory, unlimited expression is indispensable to the ad-
vancement of knowledge.' The most rational judgments are attained by allowing
plenary access to intellectual marketplace' because in a forensic contest between
truth and falsehood the former will eventually prevail.7 This model admits all
arguments, even of those persons considered less gifted in their thought processes.'
Rules for Resident Care 9 (J), II, p. 30. Handbook for Employees, Beatrice State
Home Revised June, 1973.
I. Individual residents with a past record of writing inappropriate news will have
their mail screened by the unit social worker.
II. Ward employees should screen out all letters which are scribbled, or other-
wise ineligible. Id. [Emphasis supplied in brief.]
Georgia Newton, a named plaintiff, was allegedly denied the right to socialize
with men (Complaint, p. 5 § 5d), even though she was 26 years old, had been
employed and had evidently developed the necessary social skills. Id. at 17.
For other instances where the institutionalized person's communications are restricted, see
Stowers v. Wolodzko, 386 Mich. 119, 191 N.W.2d 355 (1971); McEwan, The Difference
Between Civil and Penal Institutions from the Perspective of the Inmate in L. ORLAND,
JUSTICE, PUNISHMENT, TREATMENT 43 (1973); W. BUFORD & L. GoSTIN, PATIENTS' RIGHTS
IN NORTH CAROLINA'S MENTAL HEALTH INSTITUTIONS (1973) (obtainable through the
North Carolina Department of Mental Hygiene, Library of Congress Catalog Number: 73-
87974); AMEaCAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 155 (rev. ed.
S. Brakel & R. Rock 1971); E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF
MENTAL PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES 31, 41 (1961); Ferleger, Loosing the Chains: In-
Hospital Civil Liberties of Mental Patients, 13 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 447, 449, 454, 456
(1973); Rollins, Suggested Revisions of North Carolinds Laws on Involuntary Hospitalization
for Mental Illness, N.C. MED. J. 1019-20 (Dec. 1972); Haggerty, Kane, & Udall, An Essay on
the Legal Rights of the Mentally Retarded, 6 FAMILY L. Q. 59, 64 (1972).
4 Although there has been a decline in the total resident population of mental institutions
in the United States, there were still 275,995 resident patients as of 1972. Developments, supra
note 3, at 1402-03.
5 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951); Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 375 (1927) '(Brandeis, J., concurring); D. FELLMAN, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM
45-55 (1959); Z. CHAisE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 137-38 (1946). See also
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YA'L IJ. 877, 879 n.2
(1963); Richardson, Freedom of Expression and the Function df Courts, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1,
3-4 nn.6-10 (1951).
6 See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 '(1969); Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); United States v. Associated
Press, 52 F.Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
7 Z. CHAFEE, supra note 5, at 298, quoting BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, AN APOLOGY FOR
PRNTERS (1731): "When men differ in opinion, both sides ought equally to have the advan-
tage of being heard by the public; and when truth and error have their fair play, the former
is always an overmatch for the latter." See also Milton, Areopagitica in ENGLISH REPRINTS
(Arber ed. 1869): "Let her and Falsehood grapple; whoever knew truth put to worse, in a free
and open encounter?" But see Brett, Free Speech, Supreme-Court Style: A View from Over-
seas, 46 TEx. L REv. 668, 680-82 (1968).
8 Richardson, supra note 5, at 5: "The 'poor and puny anonymities' of a 'creed of
ignorance and immaturity' must be accorded the same constitutional protection as the care-
fully weighed pronouncements of the loyal opposition." A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM
19-28 (1968); E. MARTIN, LIBERTY 199 (1930): "Assuming that the foolish [the 'neurotic
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The utility of an opinion is itself a matter of opinion and all opinions must
remain open to continuous discussion if the truth is to emerge. Censorship
weakens the democratic process because it presumes to decide issues for others
without allowing them to hear the contrary view.'0 It is only by testing personal
judgment against all opposing judgments that an individual can make rational
decisions.""
One might object that an individual not in full control of his faculties cannot
possibly contribute to the search for truth; only sane men can formulate vera-
cious ideas. This objection, however, implies that one can readily distinguish the
sane from the mentally defective,'2 and that the person designated defective
cannot contribute to the cause of truth. In Western culture, the psychiatrist finally
determines who is mentally defective and, consequently, whose speech will be
censored and under what circumstances. The psychiatrist will restrict communi-
cation based upon his individual clinical judgment or by acceding to the ad-
ninistrative judgment of the staff of a mental hospital. The restriction is often
in large part due to the content of the speech. Ross and Victoroff,'5 writing in a
manual designed primarily for the psychiatric physician, stated:
The paranoid patient may write to newspapers or public officials outside
the hospital making unfounded charges against the hospital or against those
who admitted him . . .. [I]n such situations mental hospitals have tra-
ditionally exercised a power of censorship over both incoming and out-
going mail.' 4
This silencing of expression is itself an assumption of infallibility 5 since the
psychiatrist obviously decides whether the patient's charges are "unfounded."
The psychiatrist acts as a censor by suppressing an expression with which he
disagrees. So far as the community can ascertain, the only truth is that seen
through the eyes of the psychiatrist.
While a psychiatrist may recognize that, despite his extended study of mental
illness, he is fallible, he often fails to take any precaution against his own fallibil-
ity. He does not realize that to refuse a hearing to an opinion, because he is
and defective'] could be protected by the denial of free speech, truth could not possibly be the
gainer thereby, for the pursuit of truth necessarily takes place in the open."
9 Mill, On Liberty in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
110-111 (Everyman ed. 1951).
10 He who knows only his side of the case, knows little of that. His reasons may be
good,- and no one may have been able to refute them. But if he is equally unable to
refute the reasons on the opposite side; if he does not so much as know what they
are, he has no ground for preferring either opinion.
Id. at 128-29.
11 See Z. CHAFEE, supra note 5, at 561.
12 It has been argued very effectively that psychiatrists cannot readily identify the sane
from the insane. See generally T. Scnarr, BEING MENTALLY ILL (1966); Rosenhan, On Being
Sane in Insane Places, 13 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 379 (1973).
13 V. VIcTOROFF & H. Ross, HOSPITALIZING THE MENTALLY ILL IN OHIO xx '(1969).
But see Procunier v. Martinez, 94 S. Ct. 1800 (1974). The Supreme Court reviewed prison
regulations which required the censorship of mail written by inmates which "unduly complain"
or "magnify grievances." In holding these regulations unconstitutional, the Supreme Court
noted that the censorship of unflattering opinions did not serve either the state interest of
security, order, or rehabilitation.
14 V. VICTOROFF & H. Ros, supra note 13, at 143.
15 See Z. CHAFEE, supra note 5, at 520; Mill, supra note 9, at 105.
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sure that it distorts reality, is to assume his own certainty. The marketplace of
ideas remains less competitive insofar as the ideas of "the mentally ill" are judged
unworthy of access. Zechariah Chafee summarized the point well:
Whenever we authorize a particular restriction on liberty we ought not to
forget that we are entrusting to fallible human beingg a power over the minds
of others. Benjamin Franklin... stated... that the desireability of stamping
out evil thoughts is obvious, but the question remains whether any human
being is good and wise enough to exercise it.16
The psychiatrist assumes almost plenary power over a class of human
beings." He must take care not to abuse the natural right of his patients to com-
municate: the definition of sanity or truth involves reconciling and combining
many viewpoints."
Complete liberty of thought and discussion has traditionally been considered
beneficial to the social order. Furthermore, the fundamental purpose of the social
order is the promotion of each individual's well-being. Therefore, the develop-
ment of individuality and self-fulfillment is the primary benefit to be derived
from freedom of expression. 9 Just as every opinion is useful for the social good,
so there is an individual human need to communicate freely and to entertain a
unique experiment of living."
A human being's written or verbal language is the primary reflection of
his individuality, and the means by which he displays his self-image and self-
16 Z. CHAFER, supra note 5, at 520.
17 Psychiatry as a field has been defined as a "system of social control." See generally T.
SZASz, LAw, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY 39-88 (1963).
18 Compare the following views: J. S. MILL, PREFACES TO LIBERTY 41 (Wishy ed. 1959):
For if you determine before-hand that opinions shall be promulgated only on one
side of the question, in whom will you rest the power of determining which side shall
be chosen? The answer is in those who are most enlightened and best qualified to
judge. But there are no determinable and universal marks by which wisdom is
known. To whom will you give the power of determining what men are the most
enlightened?
Z. CHAFEE, supra note 5, at 520-21:
It is true that sometimes in our modern society we have to run the risk of abuses
in the limitation of various kinds of liberty, because the evils we aim to avoid are
so serious .... However, the risk of human error ought to be weighed in each case;
and even when this risk is run it ought to be minimized as far as possible through
the selection of persons who by training, habits, social background, are least apt to
act mistakenly or unjustly.
E. MARTrN, supra note 8, at 200:
A first-rate mind would have nothing to do with such business [censorship]. It is
intolerance, not desire for improvement, which commonly menaces freedom of speech.
Intolerance and insincerity: I do not believe there was ever a censorship established
except to perpetrate a falsehood.
Milton, supra note 7, at 54-55:
It cannot be deny'd but that he who is made judge to sit upon the birth, or death
of books . . . had need to be a man above the common measure, both studious,
learned, and judicious .... If he be of such worth as he behoovs him, there cannot
be a more tedious and unpleasing journey-work, a greater losse of time levied upon
his head .... Seeing therefore those who now possesse the imployment, by all evi-
dent signs with themselves well ridd of it, and that no man of worth, none that is not
a plain unthrift of his own hours is ever likely to succeed them . . . we may easily
foresee what kind of licencers we are to expect hereafter, either ignorant, imperious,
and remisse, or basely pecuniary.
19 See generally Emerson, supra note 5, at 79-81; Mill, supra note 9, at 152-76; Richard-
son, supra note 5, at 4; B. MARTIN, supra note 8, at 193-238.
20 Mill, supra note 9, at 153.
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worth. Freedom to develop and verbally assert one's own beliefs and opinions
allows the individual to realize his fullest potential to develop his faculties,21 to
develop his character,22 and to achieve a measure of positive self-regard. For
these reasons, Milton described censorship as the "greatest displeasure and in-
dignity to a free and knowing spirit that can be put upon him.""
This theory of free speech applies with particular force to the "lower
orders" of society such as the mentally ill. Societal intolerance along with fear
of the deviant life-styles of those classified as mentally ill are the prime causes of
the censorship of this social group. Nothing destroys freedom so surely as the
spread of intolerance and the presence of fear." If liberty is to exist, the com-
munity cannot feel shocked or scandalized when custom is not followed; it
cannot be aesthetically offended by differing tastes; and it cannot feel threatened
by abnormal thought, language, appearance, or behavior. Yet, it is as true
today2 as it was in Mill's time that
the man, and still more the woman, who can be accused either of doing
"what nobody does," or of not doing "what everybody does?' is... in peril
of a commission de lunatice, and of having their property taken from them
and given to their relations.2
The value of individuality should be apparent because deep within everyone
21 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
22 Emerson, supra note 5, at 879.
23 See generally C. ROGERS, ON BECoMING A PERSON (1961).
24 Milton, supra note 7, at 55.
25 E. MARTN, supra note 8, at 194-95. See also J. LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOL-
ERATION (M. Montuori, ed. 1963).
26 Human beings fear others with an abnormal appearance. This is illustrated (although
often in an exaggerated form) in much of our literature and art. The classic case is the fear
of the person with "an insane look in his eye." Compare E. PoE, THE TELL TAL.E HEART
(1843) (the fictional portrayal of man's obsessive fear of an old man's glazed, filmy, dis-
torted eye) with Francisco Goya y Lucientes' painting of The Desperates or the Proverbios
(the artist, in attempting to create a scene which will evoke fear in the viewer, utilizes the
classical portrayal of a madman. He paints his characters with a crazed look in their eyes).
27 See generally B. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY (1972); T. SZASZ, THE MAxu-
FACTUE0 o MADNESS (1970).
28 Mill, supra note 9, at 168-69. Mill's footnote placed at this point in his text is worthy
of restatement because of its description of the intolerance of the community to the slightest
deviant activity:
There is something both contemptible and frightful in the sort of evidence on
which, of late years, any person can be judicially declared unfit... ; All the minute
details of his life are pried into, and whatever is found which, seen through the
medium of the perceiving and describing faculties of the lowest of the low, bears an
appearance unlike absolute commonplace, is laid before the jury as evidence of in-
sanity, and often with success; the jurors being little, if at all, less vulgar and
ignorant than the witnesses; while the judges, with that extraordinary want of
knowledge of human nature and life which continually astonishes us in English
lawyers, often help to mislead them. These trials speak volumes as to the state of
feeling and opinion among the vulgar with regard to human liberty. So far from
setting any value on individuality - so far from respecting the right of each indi-
vidual to act, in things indifferent, as seems good to his own judgment and inclina-
tions, judges and juries cannot even conceive that a person in a state of sanity can
desire such freedom. In former days, when it was proposed to burn atheists, chari-
table people used to suggest putting them in a madhouse instead: it would be nothing
surprising now-a-days were we to see this done, and the doers applauding themselves,
because, instead of persecuting for religion, they had adopted so humane and Chris-
tian a mode of treating these unfortunates, not without a silent satisfaction at their
having thereby obtained their deserts.
[V"ol. 50:419]
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is a desire to seek differentiation from the nameless crowd. The development of
character and individual personality is a primary requisite for human happiness.
Individual differences in communication and association are important not only
for human dignity, but also for the development of interpersonal skills. No
person, especially no institutionalized person, can develop communicative skills
without ample opportunity to experiment with thought and language in his own
way. Conformity causes only stagnation.29
Free speech is not only necessary in the search for truth but also indispens-
able to the operation of a democracy."0 It has been labeled "the cornerstone of
the structure of self-government" without which "government by the consent of
the governed would have perished from the earth."'" Self-government, however,
requires that the normal political processes be available to all groups, including
those whose access to the political system has traditionally been limited.3 2 The
insular or discrete minority, those who have no realistic opportunity to influence
their social situation through the democratic process, must be assured freedom of
expression: in no other way can they hope to affect the political process so as to
elevate their social status.3 3
The mentally handicapped as a group fit naturally into the prototype of the
insular minority. This is especially true of the nearly one-half million persons
labeled "mentally ill" and institutionalized each year. 4 The impact that these
persons can normally hope to make on the political system is de ninimis. Insti-
tutionalized residents are usually denied the franchises , and barriers exist to
normal social intercourse between them and the majority, which is exclusively
authorized to make policy under a system of self-government.
In addition to the temporal barriers imposed by the institution's physical
plant," there are incorporeal obstacles to meaningful communication between
the institutionalized resident and civil society. The resident's disregard for his
own self-worth 7 impedes his desire to communicate effectively. The involuntary
29 Strangely, mental hospitals are the ultimate breeders of conformity. The institutionalized
residents all eat and sleep in unison. They are told when, where and how they are to work
and play. In short, every decision that a resident could feasibly make for himself so as to
assert his individuality is made for him. It is a small wonder that often upon his exit from the
institution he cannot function on a day-to-day basis in the community. See E. GOFFMAN,
supra note 3, at 4, 5.
30 See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8; Emerson, supra note 5, at 882-84.
31 A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 55.
32 Mill, supra note 9, at 143:
On any of the great open questions just enumerated, [opinions favorable to
democracy and to aristocracy; to property and to equality, to sociality and indi-
viduality] if either of the two opinions has a better claim than the other, not merely
to be tolerated, but to be encouraged and countenanced, it is the one which happens
at the particular time and place to be in a minority. That is the opinion which, for
the time being, represents the neglected interests, the side of human well-being which
is in danger of obtaining less than its share.
33 Z. Chafee, supra note 5, at 4.
34 Note, Application of the Fifth Amendment Privilege against Self-Incrimination to the
Civil Commitment Proceedings, 1973 Duke L.J. 729 n.1.
35 See Developments, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L. Rav. 1190, 1198
n.23 (1974).
36 See E. GOFFm N, supra note 3, at 4.
37 See Wales, Adjustment to the Total Institution in THE AGE oi, MADNESS 267, 268,
275-77 (T. Szasz, ed. 1973); E. GOFFMAN, supra note 3, at 14-35, 131-32, 354-56 (description
of the process of "mortification of the self") ; Developments, supra note 3, at 1200-01. See also
C. ROGERS, ON BECOMNG A PERSON (1961).
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admission process, the house rules, and the values imposed by the wider world
"press home to the patient that he is, after all, a mental patient who has suf-
fered some kind of a social collapse."' Thus, the resident senses that his speech
cannot contribute to the social well-being. Moreover, every communication that
the resident is likely to engage in with civil society will be accompanied by a
reminder that this is a communication with a mental patient and therefore may
be disregarded." The mail that the resident sends is postmarked with the stamp
of the mental hospital; the visits from friends and relatives occur within the
hospital plant while the resident remains in his or her hospital garb; the buses
which transport the resident into the outside world are marked with the hospital
emblem. Statements made by the resident under these circumstances may be
discounted as mere manifestations of the symptomatology of the patient's mental
malady. Finally, the resident's uniquely degraded living situation 0 and the
uniform sedation administered by hospital personnel also inhibit effective inter-
action with persons outside the institution.
The "mentally ill" are thus clearly an insular minority, devoid of a signicant
opportunity to change their social status through the democratic process. To this
extent, their status undermines our system of self-government, for unless a democ-
racy receives input from all of its disparate interest groups it will remain in-
effectual.
III. The Advent of the First Amendment
Free speech protects three types of interests. These are the social interest in
the attainment of truth, the individual interest in self-expression in order to
maintain human dignity, and the interest of the insular minority in a system of
self-government.
The framers of the first amendment were mindful of these values of free
expression. 1 They shared the beliefs of Milton42 and Locke 3 that free expression
is the fountainhead of a healthy society and that it should be left unfettered.4
They were also cognizant of the various state interests which justified some im-
pediments on freedom of expression. Chief among these interests was the security
38 E. GOFFmAN, supra note 3, at 151.
39 Id. at 24.
40 See, e.g., Ferleger, supra note 14.
41 To the Inhabitants of the Province of Quebec, October 24, 1774, in L. LnvY, LEGAOY
OF SUPPRESSION 176-77 (1960). In presenting its case before the people of Quebec, the
Congress released this statement:
The last right we shall mention regards the freedom of the press. The importance
of this consists, besides the advancement of truth, science, morality and arts in general,
in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of government, its ready
communication of thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promotion of
union among them, whereby oppressive officials are shamed or intimidated into more
honorable and just modes of conducting affairs. Id.
See generally Z. CHAFEE, How HUMAN RIGHTS GOT INTO THE CONSTITUTION 10-17 (1952);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) '(Bradeis, J., concurring).
42 Milton, supra note 7.
43 J. LoCKE, supra note 25; J. LocKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
(London ed. 1879).
44 See generally L. LEVY, supra note 41, at 88-125.
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of the colonies.45 In fact, the leaders of the colonies muffled expression which
offered even the slightest affront to the struggle against England.46
It was with this knowledge and within this context that the framers of the
first amendment undertook to reconcile these competing interests.47 The express
language of the first amendment stands as an admonition that they had struck
the balance in favor of unfettered expression:4" "Congress shall pass no law...
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press."4
Despite the mandate of the literal language of the first amendment,s0 an
analysis of the leading cases decided by the Supreme Court demonstrates that
the Court has consistently recognized that freedom of speech and press is not
an unlimited, unqualified right, but that the interest in free speech must on oc-
casion be subordinated to other values and considerations.-"
The specific issue in this article is whether the State may constitutionally
suppress free expression of the institutionalized resident or other person labeled
45 L. Lavy, supra note 41, at 180. Francis Hopkinson, a representative of the Continental
Congress, conceived of the circumstances where the State would be justified in suppressing
free expression:
[The liberty of the press is one of the most important privileges of government.]
But when this privilege is manifestly abused, and the press becomes an engine for
sowing the most dangerous dissensions, for spreading false alarms, and undermining
the very foundations of government, ought not that government upon the plain prin-
ciples of self-preservation to silence by its own authority, such a daring violator of its
peace, and tear from its bosom the serpent that would sting it to death? Id.
46 Mr. Hopkinson concluded that the government would be justified in "silencing a
press, whose weekly productions insult the feelings of the people, and are so openly inimical
to the American cause." Id. at 180-81.
47 Z. CHAFEE, supra note 5, at 31:
The true meaning of freedom of speech seems to be this. One of the most impor-
tant purposes of society and government is the discovery and spread of truth on
subjects of general concern. This is possible only through absolutely unlimited dis-
cussion .... Nevertheless, there are other purposes of government, such as order, the
training of the young, protection against external aggression. Unlimited discussion
sometimes interferes with these purposes, which must then be balanced against free-
dom of speech, but freedom of speech ought to weigh very heavily in the scale. The
First Amendment gives binding force to this principle of political wisdom.
48 The first philosopher to read the First Amendment literally was Alexander Meiklejohn;
the first Supreme Court Justice was Hugo Black. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8; Black, The
Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 865, 879 (1960):
Of course the decision to provide a constitutional safeguard for a particular right,
such as ... the right of free speech protection of the First [Amendment], involves
a balancing of conflicting interests .... I believe, however, that the Framers them-
selves did this balancing when they wrote the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
49 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
50 The language of the first -amendment, although it appears clear on its face, has been
criticized as ambiguous. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 523 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring); Emerson, supra note 5; Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARv. L. Rlv. 891, 897-
98 (1949). The absolute nature of the amendment's command would have been clearer had
the amendment read: "Congress shall pass no law abridging speech" Mendelson, On the
Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CAL. L. RIv. 821 (1962). See
Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1432-50 (1962). Note, The
Speech and Press Clause of the First Amendment as Ordinary Language, 87 HAzv. L. Rnv.
374, 382-89 (1973). It is similarly unclear whether the framers of the Constitution intended
the first amendment to outlaw seditious libel. Compare Z. CHAFEE, supra note 5, at 18-22
with L. LEvY supra note 41.
51 E.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U.S. 109, 126-27 '(1959); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 405 (1953); Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 n.33
(1951); Am. Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 398 (1950); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942); Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914).
[February 1975]
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
"mentally ill." In order to examine this legal question, several levels of consti-
tutional analysis will be undertaken.
IV. Application of the First Amendment: A First Level Analysis
Under the theoretical framework of constitutional free expression, the first
amendment protects speech as a "preferred liberty" 2 but does not protect con-
duct."3 In some cases, however, conduct expresses an idea: the action then
becomes utterance and engenders a degree of first amendment protection.'
The reverse is also true: certain well-defined and limited categories of speech,
because of the natural and probable effect of the utterance, become synonymous
with conduct.55 The very utterance of the words leads almost immediately to
retaliatory violence or direct injury to the listener's sensibilities. As with most
actions these words do not form an essential part in the exposition of ideas, 6
and are consequently left unprotected by the first amendment.-
Included within the narrowly limited class of words which theoretically
receives no constitutional protection are "obscenities"" and "fighting words."59
Therefore, the first level of constitutional free speech analysis must be an exami-
nation of whether the expression can be categorized as an "obscenity" or a
"fighting word.260
52 See generally Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-96 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring); M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECiH 108-21 (1966); McKay, The Preference for Free-
dom, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 1182 (1959).
53 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940):
Thus, the [First] Amendment embraces two concepts - freedom to believe and
freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot
be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.
54 See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
55 Mr. Justice Holmes stated this opinion long ago in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47, 52 (1919):
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from
an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force.
The principle is as ancient as the English common law itself. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COSMEN-
TAUEs *150:
Besides actual breaches of the peace, any thing that tends to provoke or excite
others to break it, is an offence of the same denomination. Therefore, challenges tofight, either by word or letter, or to be the bearer of such challenge, are punishable
by fine and imprisonment, according to the circumstances of the offence.
56 See generally Z. CHAFEE, supra note 5, at 149-52; Emerson, Freedom of Association
and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 21-22 (1964).
57 Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20
(1973); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19-28 (1971); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S.
36, 50 (1961); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). But note that
the line between speech as "pure speech" and speech which is so akin to "action" that it is
left unprotected by the first amendment is finely drawn. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525
(1958).
58 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 54 (1973); Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972); United States v. Reidel,
402 U.S. 351, 354 '(1971); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
59 See notes 65-67 infra and accompanying text.
60 Libelous expression was commonly considered within the narrowly limited class of
utterances which did not receive constitutional protection. See New York Times Co. v. Sul-
livan, 376 U.S. 254, 268 n.6 (1964). However, in light of New York Times v. Sullivan and
its progeny, it can hardly be said that "libelous" expression is granted no constitutional pro-
tection (unless one adopts the legal fiction that New York Times v. Sullivan merely altered
the test of what expression will be considered libelous).
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The guidelines for the factual determination of an "obscenity" have had a
"tortured" history in the Supreme Court." The latest guidelines come from the
companion cases of Miller v. California62 and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton6
The test should by now be familiar: (1) "Whether the 'average person applying
contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest"; (2) whether the work patently depicts sexual
conduct; and (3) whether the work as a whole lacks serious social value. 4
The test for "fighting words," as enunciated in Chaplinsky V. New Hamp-
shire,5 is whether the words are likely to provoke an immediate violent reaction in
an average listener. Subsequent cases indicate that the category of "fighting
words" is particularly limited.66 The words must be employed in a personally
provocative fashion, clearly directed toward the person of the listener. They can-
not be merely general, undirected abusive or opprobrious remarks. Undif-
ferentiated apprehension of a violent reaction will not place the expression within
the category of "fighting words."
Often the expressions of the mentally handicapped cause considerable an-
noyance to passersby, friends, and family members. The speech of the mentally
ill sometimes sounds bizarre," profane,/ or pretentious.* The linguistic patterns
of the schizophrenic have been described as dissocative, autistic, impersonal, and
remote." Such language may initially appear to be of the kind contemplated in
Paris Adult Theatre I or Chaplinsky. However, an application of the principles
suggested above illustrates that the annoyance or intolerance of the listener is,
without more, an insufficient constitutional justification for the abridgement
of a speaker's communication."
First, it cannot be plausibly maintained that the bizarre, neologistic use of
words, even in a superficially profane manner, is legally obscene. In order to
classify an expression as obscene, it must suggest an erotic image. 3 The dissocia-
61 See generally Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
62 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
63 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
64 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973).
65 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942). See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940).
66 See Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 "(1974); Norwell v. City of Cincinnati,
414 U.S. 14 (1973); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972); Gooding v. Wilson, 405
U.S. 518 (1972); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 567 (1970). See also Rutzick,
Offensive Language and the Evolution of First Amendment Protection, 9 HIAv. Cry. RiGHTS-
Crv. LiB. L. REv. 1 (1974); Note, "Offensive Speech" and the First Amendment, 53 B.
U.L. Rzv. 834 (1973).
67 Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 524-25 '(1972).
68 J. RuEsca, THERAPEUTIc COMMUNICATION 371 (1961).
69 See, e.g., E. BLEULER, DEMENTIA PRAECOX 153 (1950).
70 Id. at 157.
71 See J. RuEscH, supra note 68, at 371; E. BLEULER, supra note 69, at 147, 157; J.
RUESCH, DISTURBED COMMUNICATION 44 (1957).
72 The first amendment will not yield to the "sensibilities of passers-by who might be
shocked," Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 591 (1969), nor to the "public inconvenience,
annoyance, or unrest," Teriniello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949), nor the "squeamish"
intolerances of the public, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). See Organization
for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
73 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
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tive use of words such as "penis-murderer"' is not intended to be profane, 5 nor
is it normally heard as profane by the average listener. The language is more
directly perceived as simply bizarre. Certainly it does not transmit an erotic
message.
Second, the tense, impersonal or pretentious 8 tone of some schizophrenic
language does not turn such speech into "fighting words." Unless a specific
listener could reasonably regard the speaker's words as personally insulting, the
Chaplinsky doctrine does not apply."' In most instances, the undifferentiated use
of schizophrenic language is not specifically directed at the person of the listener.
There is no real danger that the words will provoke immediate violence.
Under a first level constitutional analysis, most speech which may psychiat-
rically be classified as bizarre, pretentious or disoriented is not outside the protec-
tion of the first amendment.
V. Reconciliation of the Competing Interests: A Second Level Analysis
Under a variety of different formulae, the Supreme Court has asked whether
in particular circumstances the State may justifiably restrict unfettered expres-
sion; 8 whether in such cases the State interest is in preventing a danger of a
substantial magnitude;79 and finally, whether the permissible restriction on free
expression is only as stringent as necessary under the special circumstances of the
controversy."0 This necessarily involves a balancing of the competing interests on
a case-by-case basis,"' and may subject the parties to the particular predilections
of the different justices.8 2
The generic term "balancing" describes the process by which the Court
compares the individual and societal interests in free expression with the social
interest sought by the governmental action restricting free expression. Although
the Supreme Court has failed to develop a single comprehensive, coherent first
amendment theory,"s it has utilized several tests for the reconciliation of these
74 E. BLEULER, supra note 69, at 153.
75 Id.; Rutzick, supra note 66, at 2.
76 See J. RuESCE, DISTURBED COMMUNICATION 44 (1957).
77 Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 524-25 (1972).
78 Robertsonv. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897).
79 See notes 91-95 infra and accompanying text.
80 See notes 119-35 infra and accompanying text.
81 The Supreme Court has expressly sanctioned the use of a balancing test on numerous
occasions. See United States Civil Service Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO,
413 U.S. 548, 564 (1973), quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968);
Branzberg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 716-17 n.6 '(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting), Konigsberg v.
State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961); Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961) and cases cited therein; Uphaus v. Wyman, 360
U.S. 72 (1959) ; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126-27 (1959) ; Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178, 198 (1957); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 275-89 (1951)(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-25 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring), Am. Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 409 (1950);
United Public Workers of America, CIO v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 95-96 (1947); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). See also
Note, Civil Disabilities and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 842, n.4 (1969); M. SPIrmo,
FREEDOm OP SPEFCH 76-107 (1966).
82 See Emerson, supra note 5, at 912-14; Frantz, supra note 50, at 1441-42.
83 See generally T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM or EXPREssION (1970).
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competing interests.8 4 These include: "bad tendency," 5 "ad hoc balancing," '
"gravity of the evil,""" "clear and present danger,"88 "incitement,"8 9 and "com-
84 See generally Emerson, supra note 5, at 908-16. The different formulae used from time
to time by the Supreme Court are set out in footnotes 85-90 infra. They are presented approx-
imately in the order in which each grants the legislature a presumption of validity in its
regulation of free expression: the "bad tendency" test grants the legislature maximum defer-
ence and "compelling state interest" places a heavy burden on the government in order to
justify its regulation.
85 The bad tendency test was presented by Justice Sanford in Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652 (1925). Its rationale has since been repudiated. See Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969). As presented in Gitlow the test afforded the legislature maximum deference in
its regulation of free expression. Any utterance which had a tendency, or which the legis-
lature could reasonably believe had a tendency, to lead to a substantial evil could be pro-
scribed. The rationale for the test as stated by Justice Sanford was that "a single revolutionary
spark may kindle a fire that, smouldering for a time, may burst into a sweeping and destruc-
tive conflagration." 268 U.S. at 669.
86 It has been suggested that every test the Supreme Court has offered for the resolution
of first amendment issues has involved some sort of reconciliation or balancing of the compet-
ing interests in the case. As Professor Freund put it, often the Court's business is the balancing
of rights against rights, P. FREuND, Constitutional Dilemmas, in ON LAW AND JusTic 23,
35-36 (1968). What sets "ad hoe" balancing apart from other tests is that it involves an
unstructured as opposed to a formal weighing of all the competing interests involved in a
case. Cf. Brett, Free Speech, Supreme-Court Style: A View from Overseas 46 TEx L. RaV.
668, 673 (1968). While other tests accord a particular weight to the freedom of expression -
e.g., the "bad tendency" allows the free speech interest a small weight and "compelling state
interest" allows it a large weight - "ad hoc balancing" simply collects and compares all of
the interests, with the value of each interest left undefined and unstructured. See Emerson,
supra note 5, at 912-14.
It is normally assumed that "ad hoc balancing" had its first appearance in Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939). See Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE
L.J. 1424, 1425 (1962). Justice Frankfurter used the test to consistently defer to any reason-
able legislative judgment:
It is not for us to decide how we would adjust the clash of interests which this
case presents were the primary responsibility for reconciling it ours. Congress has
determined that the danger created by advocacy of overthrow justifies the ensuing
restriction on freedom of speech ....
Can we then say that the judgment Congress exercised was denied it by the Con-
stitution?
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 550-51 (1951) (Frankfurter, 3., concurring). See
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 275-76 (1951) (Frankfurter, 3., concurring). On the
other hand, Justice Black assumed the test granted maximum support for the value of freedom
of expression. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 68, 70 (Black, J., dissenting):
[The balancing concept] was first accepted as a method for insuring the complete
protection of First Amendment freedoms even against purely incidental or inadvertent
consequences [and later it was misapplied to ] governmental action that is aimed at
speech and depends for its application upon the content of speech.
Earlier Justice Black had joined in one opinion, Schneider v. State 308 U.S. 147 (1939), and
written another opinion, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), both of which adopted a
balancing approach.
Other commentators have similarly criticized "ad hoc balancing" because it is too
capricious to be consistent rule of law. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM oF FREEDOM oF
EXPRESSION 116-18, 717-18 (1970); Emerson, supra note 5, at 912-14; Fried, Two Concepts
of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Court's Balancing Tests, 76 -IARv. L. REv. 755
(1963). See also Meiklejohn, The First Amendment as an Absolute, 1961 S. CT. REv. 245;
Meiklejohn, The Balancing of Self-Preservation against Political Freedom, 49 CAL. L. Rav. 4
(1961); Meiklejohn, The Barenblatt Opinion, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 329 (1960); Meiklejohn,
What Does the First Amendment Mean? 20 U. Cmr. L. Rlv. 461 (1953). For a review of the
philosophy, cases and authority of "ad hoc balancing" through 1962, see Frantz, supra note 50,
and Emerson, supra note 5, at 912 n.37. The most recent Supreme Court adherence to an
"ad hoc balancing" process was in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm. 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973): "Balancing the various First Amendment interests involved
in the broadcast media and determining what best serves the public's right to be informed is
a task of great delicacy and difficulty." See also Note, The Speech and Press Clause of the
First Amendment as Ordinary Language, 87 HAv. L. RaV. 374, 375-82 (1973).
87 The "gravity of the evil" test is an interpretation of the "clear and present danger"
formula presented in note 88 infra. It was originated by Judge Learned Hand and introduced
by Chief justice Vinson in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951): "'In each case
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pelling state interest."" All of these formulae utilize the balancing process inas-
much as each concerns the relative importance of the various interests and their
[courts] must ask whether the gravity of the "evil," discounted by its improbability, justifies
such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.' "
88 The "clear and present danger" formulation first introduced by Justice Holmes in
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) has a scope of such enormity that its doctrinal
reaches need not be fully presented. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969);
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919);
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). See also Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and
Present Danger": From Schenck to Brandenburg-and Beyond, 1969 S. CT. Rav. 41; McKay,
The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1182, 1203-12 (1959); Mendelson, Clear and
Present Danger-From Schenck to Dennis, 52 COLUm. L. Rav. 313 (1952). The best explana-
tion of the doctrine of "clear and present danger" was presented in a concurrence by Justice
Brandeis in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927). The test is premised on the
belief that free speech and assembly are rights which are fundamental but not in their nature
absolute. Their exercise is subject to restriction in order to protect the state from serious
injury. Thus, free expression can be impeded only where it:
would produce, or is intended to produce, a clear and imminent danger of some
substantive evil which the state constitutionally may seek to prevent . .. . There
must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent.
There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious
one.
274 U.S. at 373, 376.
The more recent cases adhering to the clear and present danger doctrine include Hess v.
Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
89 The incitement test is somewhat akin to the distinction between the regulation of
expression and the regulation of action. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOm OF
EXPRESSION, 404 (1970): the former is permitted and the latter is proscribed. See Konigsberg
v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 56, 64 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting), Giboney v. Empire Storage &
Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 499 (1949). Speech can be impeded only where the communication is
so "close, direct, effective, and instantaneous in its impact that it is a part of the action." T.
EMERSON, THE SYsTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, 404 (1970). See Bond v. Floyd, 385
U.S. 116, 134 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 544-55 (1965); Shuttlesworth v. City
of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 262 (1963); Kingsley Internat'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the
University of the State of New York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242,
259-61 (1937). In the "incitement test," the government cannot proscribe mere advocacy,
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), but can only regulate that activity which crosses
the bounds of persuasion -nd actually promotes, prepares or steels a group into illegal action.
Norwell v. City of Cincinnati, 414 U.S. 14 (1973); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971);
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); Edwards v. South Carolina,
372 U.S. 229 (1963); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961); Feiner v. New
York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
90 It is often said that when a governmental regulation directly or incidentally restricts the
"preferred liberty" of freedom of expression the state must demonstrate a "compelling interest'
in order to justify its action. Despite the fact that there seems to be some authority for this
proposition, DeGregory v. Attorney Gen. of New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825, 829 (1966), citing
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963); N.A.A.C.P. v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) ;
N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958), citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234, 265 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), it is entirely incongruent with the applicable
first amendment case law. The government has successfully regulated free expression in several
areas, and this is especially so where the government regulation places only an incidental burden
on the freedom of expression. See Am. Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 397
(1950). For example: (1) The court has upheld regulations which incidentally burdened the
freedom of the press despite the fact that there was no finding that the government had a
"compelling interest." The press cannot knowingly damage private reputation without paying
damages. Gertz v. Welch, 94 S. Ct. 2997 (1974); Old Dominion Branch, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter
Carriers v. Austin, 94 S. Ct. 2770 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971);
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971); Greenbelt Corp. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler,
398 U.S. 6 (1970), Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 147 (1967); Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80
(1964). A newspaper can be punished for contempt in appropriate circumstances. Craig v.
Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 377-78 (1947). Journalists can be compelled to disclose their sources
to investigating bodies. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The press is not exempt
from the National Labor Relations Act, Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S.
186, 192-93 (1946) ; Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937), or the antitrust
laws, Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). Newspapers can be subject to
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particular impact on the controversy. The only perceptible variance among these
formulae is the degree to which each affords the governmental regulation a
presumption of constitutionality. Each formula correspondingly attributes a
unique weight, force, or value to freedom of expression.
Regardless of the applicable test, two factors are always probative in the
disposition of a first amendment controversy. The first is the substantiality of
the State interest. This includes the gravity of the evil which the State seeks to
avoid and the probability of its occurrence. The second is the scope of the
regulation itself, the extent to which the governmental regulation infringes the
individual's right to free expression. This includes the manner of the regulation's
application as well as the specific effect on free expression engendered by the
state's action.
A. Substantiality of the State Interest
A governmental action suppressing speech must be supported by more than
a merely "reasonable" interest in order to overcome the burden placed on the
State by the first amendment.9 A government regulation is likely to receive
priority over first amendment claims if the State offers a cogent justification for
the regulation unrelated to the suppression of free expression. 2 However, even
general taxation. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943); Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936). The press can be prohibited from printing employment
advertisements which refer to sex in employment headings. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human
Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973). (2) The court has upheld regulation of the time,
place or manner of utterance without requiring the state to demonstrate a "compelling interest."
The individual can be required to procure a permit, which is issued without unfair discrimi-
nation, before parading on public streets. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). The
individual can be punished for speaking through "any device . . . which emits . . . loud and
raucous noises.... ." Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 78, (1949). The individual can be for-
bidden to protest in a jail. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). The individual can be
punished for making excessive noise near school buildings. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104 (1972). All of these cases involve instances where the government placed a burden
on the exercise of free expression. The Court consistently upheld the regulation without requir-
ing the State to justify its action with a compelling interest.
91 That freedom of expression is a cherished value in the constitutional history of the
Supreme Court is by now clear. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529 (1945);
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262, 263 (1941); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Yet there is still some controversy about whether there
is a shift from a general presumption of constitutionality to a specific presumption of uncon-
stitutionality when the challenged government action impinges upon free expression. See
generally C. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLF AND THE COUPT 217-21 (1960).
92 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). Among the State interests
which have, on occasion, been conceded priority over individual welfare claims are: (1) the
maintenance of municipal tranquility and local law and order. E.g., Grayned v. City of Rock-
ford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970);
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Kovacs
v. Cooper 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). (2) the public's
need to possess information. E.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Cole v. Richard-
son, 405 U.S. 676 (1972); Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc., v. Wadmond,
401 U.S. 154 (1971); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927). (3) efficient ad-
ministration of government functions. E.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973);
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548
(1973); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). (4y upholding
standards of decency and morality of the community. See cases cited supra note 58. Accord,
Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973); United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, 413
U.S. 123 (1973); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973); Heller v. New York, 413 U.S.
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the most substantial State interest will yield in appropriate circumstances." It
is therefore not instructive to attempt to state the precise quality of the govern-
mental interest needed by adopting such phrases as "compelling," "paramount,"
or "subordinating."" The Supreme Court uses these terms more to signal the
outcome of the case than to provide an explanation of the criteria used in making
the decision. Once the infringement on individual liberties is considered so
extensive that the State will need a "compelling interest" in order to justify its
action, the controversy is all but decided 5
State action restricting an institutionalized resident's freedom of expression
might potentially be justified by any of three governmental interests. First, there
is the interest in protecting society from any physical danger which may result
from the utterance or association. This interest will weigh heavily in the first
amendment balance and will usually prevail over the varied individual interests
in free expression. However, the government can only rarely offer this interest
as a justification for restricting communication in a mental hospital. It has been
established that mental patients are not more dangerous than the population at
large.9 6 Such a governmental interest can be offered only on an individualized
basis and must be based upon evidence which establishes that the communication
will create a clear and imminent probability of harm to other persons.
Second, there is the State's interest in the effective administration of the
483 (1973), Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, (1973); Alexander v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 836
(1973); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photo-
graphs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971). (5) national security. See cases cited note 93 infra. (6) pro-
tection of citizenry against damages to reputation, and invasion of privacy. See cases cited at
note 90 supra.
93 Chief Justice Vinson in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 49, 509 (1951) called the
state interest in national security "the ultimate value of any society." The foundation cases
in this area are Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) ; Frohwerk v. United States,
249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616 (1919). All of these cases were decided in 1919 and all affirmed criminal judg-
ments under the Espionage Act in the face of first amendment claims. These cases demonstrate
Vinson's point that internal security is a powerful state interest. Yet the fact that even the
highest of state interests will yield given the proper circumstances has been illustrated by later
cases. Thus, post-World War I decisions do not defer so easily the state interest in national
security. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298
(1957); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937);
Fiske v. Kanas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927). But see Communist Party of the United States v. Sub-
versive Activities Control 3d., 367 U.S. 1 (1961); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951) (It is possible to explain these "peacetime" cases by noting that they were both decided
during the communist scare period of the 1950's).
94 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
95 In cases where the Court verbalizes the "compelling state interest" test, the government
invariably loses. See, e.g., DeGregory v. Attorney Gen. of New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825, 829
(1966), citing Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963);
N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524
(1960); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958), citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234, 254 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The precedent has been set in equal
protection decisions. Where the Court requires the State to justify its classification by demon-
strating a "compelling interest" the government will almost invariably lose the case. In the
field of equal protection, the State has rarely demonstrated a "compelling interest." But see
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortions after viability may be constitutionally regulated
by the State despite the mother's "fundamental" interest in privacy); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (persons of Japanese ancestry excluded from a West Coast military
area despite their "fundamental" right to be free from discrimination on the basis of national
origin).
96 Roth, Dayley, & Lerner, Into the Abyss: Psychiatric Reliability and Emergency Commit-
ment Statutes, 13 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 400 (1973); Shaffer, Introduction--Symposium:
Mental Illness, the Law and Civil Liberties, 13 SANTA CLARA LAwYER 369, 371 (1973).
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institution itself. Because the constitutional basis for the incarceration of a
mental patient lies in a concern for his own well-being,97 there is little constitu-
tional warrant for restricting his rights to suit mere administrative convenience.
It is possible that indirect time, place, and manner restraints on communication
might be upheld under the shibboleth of institutional convenience,95 but normally
the governmental interest in administrative convenience will be insufficient to
authorize a restriction of the institutionalized resident's free expression.
Finally, there is the State's interest in promoting the well-being of the resi-
dent himself. In order to understand the quality of this interest, it is necessary
to evaluate the therapeutic justification both for the allowance and the restriction
of free communication.
1. The Therapeutic Justification for Encouraging Free Expression
The concept of "normalization" 9 dictates that a resident should not be
restricted in the opportunity for free expression and association. To expeditiously
return the liberty the State has taken from the resident, the institution must
keep intact all of the normal behaviors vital to a functioning citizen. This is
necessary to prevent the resident from becoming "institutionalized"-overly de-
pendent on the hospital "way of life."1 0 The resident should not grow unaccus-
tomed to exercising communicative skills because these skills are vital to the
individual's successful readjustment to the community. Normal communication
with others is a recognized therapeutic need of the institutionalized resident.'
Furthermore, communication
keeps the resident in contact with the outside world, helps to hold in check
some of the morbidity and hopelessness produced by . . . [institutional
life] . . . , stimulates his more natural and human impulses and otherwise
may make contributions to better mental health.102
97 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 3, at 36, 72-76.
98 See Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 94 S. Ct. 2811 (1974) (upholding prison regulations
which proscribed personal interviews between newsmen -and individually designated prisoners,
because of the limited scope of the prison policy) ; Pell v. Procunier, 94 S. Ct. 2800 (1974).
99 Defined as a set of principles derived from the belief that mental health institutions
should primarily serve as the agents for a resident's rehabilitation to society, that is, each in-
stitution should allow the individual to live as normally as possible. The principle of normal-
ization has been given constitutional sanction. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M. D.
Ala. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M. D. Ala. 1972), and statutory sanction in
CAL. WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS CODE §§ 5001, 5115, 5200 (West 1972).
100 Even though the hospital may have "normalized" the resident's precommitment deviant
behavior, the individual cannot leave the hospital because he or she has grown accustomed to
and dependent upon institutional life. See E. GOFFMAN, supra note 3, at 3-73 ("mass move-
ment" and other "totalistic" features of institutions foster dependence and; impair ability to
make small independent decisions). See also H. BARNES & N. TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN
CUMINOLOOY 499, 503 (3d ed. 1959) (becoming unaccustomed to exercising communicative
skills in prison is a nonnormalized behavior which can 'have adverse consequences when the
prisoner is released).
101 T. LANOER & S. MICHAEL, LIFE, STRESS AND MENTAL HEALTH 128 (1963) ("[s]ocial
isolation is a symptom of mental disturbance as well as a causal factor"); See AMERICAN COR-
RECTIONAL Ass'N, MANUAL OF STANDARDS 400 (1959); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 45
(1961).
102 H. BARNES & N. TEETERS, supra note 100, at 492.
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At the same time, the individual perceives countervailing ideas0 3 and becomes
better informed on such matters as governmental issues (thereby enabling an
intelligent use of the franchise0 4) and patients' rights °5 which are helpful in the
resident's habilitation.
2. The Therapeutic Justification for Restricting Free Expression
It has been argued that restrictions on communication are necessary for
a resident's well-being' and therefore justified under the state's parens patriae
power."' 8 Arguably, such restrictions could be constitutionally justified as serving
the rational state interest of providing care for the mentally disabled. The hos-
pital might rationally justify restrictions on first amendment freedoms through its
medical prerogatives, the so-called medical model. 9 The most prevalent use of
the medical model to restrict communication rights is "milieu" therapy. In this
model the hospital manipulates the resident's environment to modify deviant
behavior or personality traits."0 This therapeutic notion can be used to isolate
the resident from a "toxic" environment by restricting communication between
the resident and this environment." Similarly, the resident's judgment might be
so impaired as to necessitate restrictions on communication. The paradigmatic
example is the manic depressive reactive in a hypomanic stage. Such a person
is irrepressible and often unconventional in speech and manner. He is narcissistic,
childishly proud, glib of tongue, genial of hand, extravagant with money, full
of pranks, imprudent, and openly hostile and aggressive."'
During this hypomanic phase the individual may write numerous letters.
"No sooner, perhaps, has he posted a letter than he decides that the mail is too
slow for his urgent business so he dispatches a telegram to his correspondent.""'
103 Note, The Right of Expression in Prison, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 407, 419 (1967).
104 In several states, institutionalization does not automatically divest the resident of the
right to vote. See, e.g., N. M. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-15A (3) (Supp. 1973); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 202.847.1 (3) (Vernon 1972); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-48(1) (c) (1968); N. C. GEN.
STAT. § 122-55 (1963).
105 Rollins, Suggested Revisions of North Carolina's Laws on Involuntary Hospitalizationfor Mental Illness, N. 0. MED. J. 1019, 1020 (Dec. 1972): "Patients in state mental hospitals
are deprived of rights not by law, but because they are unaware of their rights."
106 See note 101 supra and accompanying text.
107 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATiON, supra note 3, at 155. Although modern medicolegal
opinion rejects the notion that residents are incapable of exercising their rights "this is not to
say that in modern times mental patients should retain all their personal rights. Effective treat-
ment in many instances necessitates withdrawal of certain patient rights". Id.
108 One of the legal theories for civil commitment is the parens patriae power of the state.
AMIERICAN BAR FouNDATION, supra note 3, at 36. Parens patriae is a right of sovereignty and
imposes a duty on the sovereign to care for persons who, because afflicted with some disability,
are unable to act in their own best interests. See generally Developments, Civil Commitment of
the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L. Rv. 1190, 1207-22 (1974).
109 Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm. on Con-
stitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., at 413
(1970):
The medical model essentially is that behavioral variances are analogous to disease
in the physical body. The implication is a distinct discontinuity in the continuum of
behavioral differences which can be objectively discerned, measured and labeled
pathological.
110 Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used to "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?" "Demol-
ish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L. Rav. 616, 621-22 (1972).
111 Id.
112 L. KOLO, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 369-70 (1973).
113 Id. at 370.
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Should the hospital, acting in the resident's best interest, censor his mail or tele-
phone communications in order to prevent the resident from: (1) impairing
his integrity and credibility in the community? (2) writing away for a subscrip-
tion to a magazine he cannot afford? (3) writing threatening letters to a family
member or government official? (4) receiving contraband in the mail?
"The hypomanic is often erotic and, if a man, may indulge in sexual excess,
while a previously chaste and modest young woman may become sexually pro-
miscuous," often making indecent and obscene proposals." 4 The manic depres-
sive in a hypomanic stage is also overreactive to the extent of violent motor
excitement. In the hospital, the resident may tear his or her clothing and destroy
objects." 5 Acting in the individual's best interests, as well as in the interest of
other residents and of outside visitors, should the hospital allow the resident to:
(1) interact with the opposite sex? (2) interact with other residents generally?
(3) interact with visitors? (4) make visits outside of the hospital? (5) interact
with legal counsel?
Given the additional psychiatric fact that on recovery from a manic stage the
individual perceives his or her past behavior as unpleasant and is sorry for
such behavior,' should the law uphold hospital restrictions on free expression
and association in these instances?'"
The first amendment may allow restrictions on communication when neces-
sary to insure the mental and physical well-being of the resident. The hospital
thus may prevent the communications illustrated in the questions posed above.
In such cases, the State has identified a substantial interest in restricting first
amendment liberties. However, to sustain such restrictions the hospital admin-
istrator must isolate a specific resident, such as a hypomanic, and give a rational
and verifiable reason for restricting first amendment rights in a particular case.
Moreover, since the mechanism used to restrict free expression in mental hospitals
may often be categorized as a prior restraint, certain procedural requirements
must be satisfied before the restriction will be upheld."'
B. Extent of the Restriction
Although the State interest is a crucial factor in a "second level" constitu-
tional free speech analysis, it is of no greater importance than the legal machinery
used to implement that goal. It is the implementation of the goals which effectu-
ates the precise restriction on first amendment liberties.
This legal machinery can be categorized under three overlapping headings:
indirect, direct, and prior restraints. Categorization under one of these headings
114 Id. at 370.
115 Id. at 371.
116 Id. at 372.
117 See generally id. at 376-77. Case study: m.m. was in and out of a state mental hospital
for years. During manic phases she signed leases on strange apartments, bought furniture,
went into debt, pawned her rings, wrote checks without finances, purchased fifty-seven hats,
instituted divorce proceedings, smoked excessively and swore loudly (contrary to usual habits),
and made advances to the physician. In the last year m.m. has lost her manic symptomatology
and has been making an excellent home and community adjustment as a housewife and mother.
If possible should the hospital have suppressed her actions while she was in a manic phase?
118 See notes 139-71 infra and accompanying text.
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possesses no independent significance unless the categories expose regulations
which differ in their relative severity. Indirect restraints are generally less re-
strictive than direct restraints because the former merely condition the exercise
of free expression while the latter affirmatively punish it. Prior restraints are
usually considered maximally restrictive of free expression because such regula-
tions seek to prevent the expression from ever occurring.
These categories are discussed below in the inverse order of their restrictive
effect on first amendment liberties. They do not provide a talismanic test in first
amendment controversies but emphasize the need for a pragmatic assessment of
the effect of legal machinery on first amendment freedoms.
1. Indirect Restraints
The regulation may only incidentally burden freedom of expression. This
"indirect, conditional [or] partial"" 9 infringement of individual liberties does
not prohibit speech but does place certain requirements on the speaker which
must be met as a condition of speaking."20 The regulation does not affect the
119 It was at one time presumed that where the infringement on first amendment liberties
was "indirect, conditional, or partial," that an ad hoc balancing test would be applied, and
where the abridgement was "direct," a classificatory approach such as "clear and present danger"
would be applied. Am. Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 396-97, 399 (1950).
Although this may no longer be completely accurate, see Note, Civil Disabilities and the First
Amendment, 78 YALn L.J. 842, 844-46 nn.12-16 (1969), the cases do demonstrate that where
the legal machinery places a small incidental burden on the freedom of expression (as opposed
to the usually more substantial burden presented by a direct infringement) the right of free
speech will yield-barring other circumstances such as unreasonableness, Hague v. CIO, 307
U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939), or arbitrariness, Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147
(1969), of the regulation-if the government interest is substantial. Konigsberg v. State Bar,
366 U.S. 36, 50-55 (1961); Am. Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 397-99
(1950).
120 Examples of conditions which may be attached as an incidental burden on exercising
first amendment rights are: (1) the requirement of filing "non-communist" affidavits with the
National Labor Relations Board as a condition subsequent to exercising first amendment rights.
Am. Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); (2) the requirement of presenting
a balanced media coverage as a condition of broadcasting. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367 (1969) ; (3) the requirement of procuring a license as a condition precedent to
parading, Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), or holding a public meeting, Poulos
v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953); Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). It
must be emphasized that in these cases the license was merely a matter of form. It was used
simply to provide public authorities with notice that public expression was about to occur. The
permit was not within the discretion of the licensing authority except to the extent that the
official may perform the ministerial task of allocating scarce public resources. See Blasi, Prior
Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 MicH. L. REv. 1482 (1970). To this extent, the license
can be treated as an incidental burden on free expression regardless of the fact that the cases
cited may also be classified as a prior restraint. In instances where the licensor is endowed
with discretion, the case takes on the more familiar form of the "classic" prior restraint and
therefore is scrutinized under a stricter form of judicial review. See notes 139-71 infra; Shuttles-
worth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268
(1951); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Lovell
v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
In other instances the line between "indirect" condition and prior restraint is still less
finely drawn. Consider the example of a state tax on a newspaper. The regulation is an
example of an "indirect' government action which places a condition upon the exercise of first
amendment rights. The newspaper need only pay the tax-therefore bearing its indirect bur-
den-and then it may go to press. There is no restraint on the content of the publication. Yet,
the tax may also be viewed as a condition precedent to publication. It may be called a "pre-
vious restraint," because the regulation impedes the communication process prior to its occur-
rence. See Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
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content of speech' 2' but rather effectuates some other governmental objective by
means incidentally affecting speech. Because no direct prohibition of speech
occurs, it is normally the least restrictive means through which the government
may implement its goal.'22
Legal machinery placing merely an incidental burden on freedom of ex-
pression, when found in combination with a substantial State interest, normally
presents a compelling case for validation of the State enactment.3 The courts
have realized that the first amendment does not guarantee that everyone shall
speak at will, but that everything worth saying shall be said." The government
may restrict an applicant to a limited number of public resources. For example,
freedom of expression does not include a contest-at the expense of the un-
willing listener-to determine who can speak loudest; 2 - it does not hold out to
all persons with opinions an unlimited opportunity to address gatherings on the
street; 12 6 and it does not imply a license to speak at any time in any forum, public
or private. The government may impede free expression by regulating the
"time, place, duration or manner" of speech because the legal machinery imposes
a de minimis burden on the individual's first amendment liberties."" Such im-
positions of free expression may be justified by numerous valid governmental
interests.12 9
121 The Supreme Court has issued broad disclaimers that it is in the business of censoring
the content of speech. Chicago Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972): "[A]bove all
else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Accord, Grayned v. City of Rock-
ford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
122 Just because a regulation is considered "indirect," is not to say that it is always less
restrictive. There are certain "incidental" burdens which can have a profound chilling effect
on first amendment rights. When this is so, these cases must be treated similarly to cases which
present a "direct" infringement on first amendment rights. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 601-02 (1967); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 (1967); Elfrandt v.
Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 16-19 (1966).
123 See note 119 supra.
124 A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 26 (1960). See also Meildejohn, The First
Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 S. CT. REV. 245, 261-62.
125 See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
See generally Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 21 (1971); Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970); Black, He Cannot
Choose But Hear: The Plight of the Captive Auditor, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 960 (1953).
126 See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345
U.S. 395 (1953); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77,
86-87 (1949); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43
(1897).
127 See Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 615-16 (1968); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S.
131 (1966); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 559
(1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S.
268, 273 (1951); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1939). See also Kalven, The
Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 S. CT. REV. 1.
128 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965). Accord, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 115 (1972); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1969);
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1941); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
306-07 (1940); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939). See Saxbe v. Washington Post
Co., 94 S. Ct. 2811 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 94 S. Ct. 2800 (1974); Amalgamated Food
Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
129 Among the state interests conceded priority over the limited individual interest in free
expression are the safety, comfort, and convenience of the local citizenry. E.g., (ox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). But see Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 273 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (state interest in
keeping public streets neat and clean is insufficient to justify an ordinance which prohibits
persons from handing out literature to people willing to receive it); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
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Even in the area of indirect restraints, however, the government may not
place an unreasonable burden on the exercise of free speech: "The crucial ques-
tion is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the
normal activity of a particular place at a particular time."'3 ° The government
cannot prohibit a quiet and peaceful protest within the confines of a library'3 ' or
a public meeting in the streets and parks; 32 but it can proscribe public demon-
strations near courthouses3 3 or prisons."' The difference is that libraries, streets,
and parks are locations which "have immemorably been held in trust for the
use of the public" and have been locations for the interchange of ideas,3 " while
courthouses and prisons exist solely for the administration of criminal justice.
2. Direct Restraints
The second manner in which a governmental regulation can raise first
amendment questions is by punishing the speaker because of the mere fact of the
utterance. This "direct" infringement of freedom of expression is usually more
suppressive of individual liberties because it controls the content of speech. The
classic example of a "direct" abridgement of free expression is the government's
attempt to promote internal security by imposing a subsequent punishment on
those who communicate subversive utterances.3" As the cases suggest,"'r where
444 (1938) (state interest in keeping the streets clean was insufficient to outweigh even the
minimal effect on free speech engendered by requiring the issuance of a permit as a condition
precedent to the distribution of literature). See generally R. O'NEiL, FREE SPEECH 48-64
(1966).
130 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). See Old Dominion Branch,
Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, AFL-CIO, 94 S. Ct. 2770 (1974).
131 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
132 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
133 Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
134 Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
135 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
136 See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354
U.S. 298 (1957); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249
U.S. 211 (1919).
137 Examples of other state regulations which "directly" infringe upon the freedom of
expression are the regulation of libelous statements, Gertz v. Welch, 94 S. Ct. 2997 (1974);
Old Dominion Branch, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 94 S. Ct. 2770 (1974); Rosen-
bloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler,
398 U.S. 6 (1970); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Associated Press v. Walker, 388
U.S. 130 (1967) ; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) ; Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64 (1964), and the regulation of inciteful speech, Norwell v. City of Cincinnati, 414
U.S. 14 (1973); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S.
111 (1969); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S.
315 (1951); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568 (1942). In both instances the regulation may be classified as "direct" because the
explicit purpose of the statute is to punish the speaker because of the message carried by his
words.
Often, it is difficult to differentiate between a direct and an indirect restraint. For example,
in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 94 S. Ct. 2831 (1974), the Supreme Court re-
viewed Florida's "right of reply" statute which grants a political candidate a right to space
to answer criticism and attacks on his record by a newspaper. It might be said that "the
statute... has not prevented the Miami Herald from saying anything it wished." Id. at 2839.
Thus, the statute might have been construed as an indirect restraint because it has neither
prevented nor punished expression. In this regard, the statute is akin to the mere burdens
placed as a condition subsequent to communication as in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (burden on press to change its format and run "sexless'
advertising) or Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (burden on reporter who must dis-
close his sources) or New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (chilling effect of
the potentiality of paying a substantial amount in damages in a libel action). However, in
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the government imposes a direct suppression of free speech the Supreme Court
tends to apply a classificatory test such as "clear and present danger," as opposed
to the use of the ad hoc balancing approach for "indirect" abridgements of free
speech.'
3. Prior Restraints
The final means by which governmental authorities can raise a first amend-
ment controversy is by devising a legal machinery which imposes a prior restraint
on free expression. In a prior restraint, the "line where legitimate suppression
begins is fixed chronologically at the time of the publication."' 3 The govern-
ment restricts free communication in advance of the actual expression and thus
prevents the communication before its occurrence. This is usually accomplished
through the use of an injunction,"' a permit system, 4' or a licensing tax. 42 By
contrast, a "direct" restraint imposes a subsequent punishment because of the
content of the expression.
To the extent a prior restraint prevents the very exercise of free expression
it is maximally suppressive of first amendment liberties. 43 Exceptions to this rule,
however, are apparent. The threat of an onerous punishment imposed sub-
sequent to a communication will as effectively preclude free expression as a court
order enjoining future utterance. The simple requirement of procuring a license,
the issuance of which is automatic, will not suppress first amendment liberties as
greatly as a severe penalty imposed subsequent to the communication.'" Strict
reliance on the form of the restraint-ignoring its precise effect upon communica-
Tornillo the Court rejected this argument and invalidated the statute. The Court viewed the
statute as a direct restraint on the right of free press: "the Florida statute exacts a penalty on
the basis of the content of a newspaper." 94 S. Ct. at 2839.
138 See Note, Civil Disabilities and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 842, 845 (1969).
139 Z. CHAFEE, supra note 5, at 9.
140 Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); New York Times Co.
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968); Teitel
Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307
(1967); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697 (1931); Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973). Ex parte seizures of obscene
materials are closely related to injunctions: both are effectuated under judicial authority. See
Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973); A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205
(1964); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961). Cf. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S.
496 (1973); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971); Lee Art
Theater, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636 (1968).
141 Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v.
Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Times Film Corp.
v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961); Kingsley Internat'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the
University of the State of New York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S.
313 (1958); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495 (1952); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Kunz v. New York, 340
U.S. 290 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946); Largentv. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943); Coxv. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Schnei-
der v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
142 Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S.
233 (1936).
143 Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROB. 648, 656-57
(1955).
144 See generally Note, Previous Restraints upon Freedom of Speech, 31 COLUM. L. REv.
1148 (1931).
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tion-is a substitution of dogma for reason.1" Nonetheless, courts have treated
the two differently. 46 When legal machinery imposes a prior restraint, the scope
of constitutionally permissible punishment subsequent to the utterance becomes
immaterial. Even if the communication incurs a subsequent penalty, it may not
be proscribed in advance by a prior restraint 47 save in exceptional cases.4
The Supreme Court's hostility toward prior restraints appears in its hold-
ings that such restraints are presumptively unconstitutional,'4 9 by its determina-
tions placing the burden of proof upon the government,' and in its use of out-
come determinative analyses. 5' The rationale for such a judicial attitude goes
145 See Note, Prior Restraint-A Test of Invalidity in Free Speech Cases? 49 COLUM. L.
REv. 1001 (1949).
146 The cases which utilize the doctrine of prior restraint, when they attempt to justify the
doctrine at all, do so by a reference to historical abhorrence of prior restraints. Carroll v.
Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 n.5 (1968); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495,
504 (1952); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 276 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1946);
Lovell v. Grilffn, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233,
245-49 (1936); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). The particular legal machinery of
prior restraint has its roots firmly planted within the jurisprudential system under which we
now operate. It can be immediately traced to 1643 where an order of Parliament specified:
[T]hat no Book etc. shall from henceforth be printed or put to sale, unless the same
be first approved of and licensed by such person or persons as both or either of the
said Houses shall appoint for the licensing of the same.J. MLTON, AREOPAGITICA 1 (Freedman ed. 1972). John Milton offered the dispositive critique
of the order of Parliament in his Areopagitica but the struggle in England directed against
censorship was not waged by him alone. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931). The
culmination of the struggle is illustrated by Blackstone's exposition of the state of English Law.
"The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in
laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal
matter when published." 4 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES * 151-52. In the United States,
Blackstone has been criticized not so much because of his special emphasis on protections
against previous restraints but because that protection should not be deemed to exhaust the
liberties granted by the right of free expression. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 714-15
(1931). The state of American law is this. The chief, but not exclusive, purpose of the first
amendment guarantee is to prevent previous restraints upon the exercise of free expression.
Freedom from restraints is not absolutely guaranteed, but by the same token, protection against
prior restraints does not exhaust the rights guaranteed by the first amendment.
T. EMERSON, THE. SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExpRp.SSSoN 506 (1970):
A system of prior restraint is in many ways more inhibiting than a system of sub-
sequent punishment: It is likely to bring under government scrutiny a far wider
range of expression; it shuts off communication before it takes place; suppression by
a stroke of the pen is more likely to be applied than suppression through a criminal
process; the procedures do not require attention to the safeguards of the criminal
process; the system allows less opportunity for public appraisal and criticism, the
dynamics of the system drive toward excess, as the history of all censorship shows.
See Emerson, supra note 143, at 656-60. See generally Milton, supra note 7.
147 See Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 418 (1971); Kunz v. New
York, 340 U.S. 290, 294-95 (1951); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931).
148 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931), implied that prior restraints would be
upheld only in "exceptional cases." Mr. Chief Justice Hughes gave as examples certain obstruc-
tions of war-making powers, obscenity and incitement to violence. He gave no reason why he
chose these to illustrate the principle, and for this reason the exceptional case notion is unin-
structive. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 506 (1970); Emerson,
supra note 143, at 660-61; Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 563 (1948) and cases cited therein.
149 Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 491 (1973); New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971);
Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57(1965); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70-72 (1963), and cases cited; Joyner v.
Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 462 (4th Cir. 1973). See Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504
(1973).
150 Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 491 (1973); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972);
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971); Joyner v. Whiting, 477
F.2d 456, 462 (4th Cir. 1973).
151 Of the numerous cases cited in notes 140-42 supra, which reflect the three major forms
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to the foundations of Western jurisprudence, which is built upon a blending of
coequal powers. The pervasive fear engendered by a system of censorship stems
from a distrust of the unilateral authority of the censor.5 2 The writings of the
great political philosophers such as Milton' and Mill,' 5' and more recently,
Chafee5 5 and Emerson,'56 bear witness to the anxieties provoked by the spectre
of the censor.
The internal workings of the "prior restraint" doctrine reflect this distrust of
the censor. Inferior administrative officials derive their power to act from the pre-
cise will of an elected body; grants of power must be based upon narrow criteria
strictly related to a valid legislative purpose and upon definite and explicit leg-
islative standards which leave the public official with only ministerial authority.57
of prior restraints, in only the following cases did the government regulation prevail. Kingsley
Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957) (focusing on the effect of the government regulation,
the court held that it was tantamount to a subsequent punishment and therefore need not be
analyzed under the higher standard of a prior restraint); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago,
365 U.S. 43 (1961) (the capacity for evil was so great that it may be controlled by a prior
restraint); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (defendants convicted for
failure to move to dissolve an injunction or apply for a permit). The same regulation was
later invalidated in Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969). Poulos v. New Hamp-
shire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (In both Poulos
and Cox, permit systems were upheld only because the licensors were without discretionary
authority); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971) (The only way
this prior restraint could be upheld was for the Supreme Court to strictly construe the statute
so as to assume strict procedural safeguards in congruence with the Freedman principle, see
notes 159-64 infra and accompanying text); Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973) (The
court did not consider that this was a prior restraint at all because there was no final restraint
upon freedom of expression). See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Comm'n on Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376 (1973) (The Court upheld an ordinance proscribing sex designated employment
columns in newspapers. Because the ordinance was "based on a continuing course of repetitive
conduct" the Court did not consider it to be a prior restraint); Donaldson v. Read Magazine,
Inc., 333 U.S. 178 (1948) (Because of the exigencies of preventing the use of the mails for
the perpetration of fraud, the Court upheld a prior restraint).
152 Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938). See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51,
57 (1965).
153 J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 23 (Everyman ed. 1927):
The State shall be my governors, but not my critics; they may be mistaken in the
choice of a licenser, as easily as this licenser may be mistaken in an author.... For
though a licenser should happen to be judicious more than ordinary, which will be
a great jeopardy of the next succession, yet his very office and his commission enjoins
him to let pass nothing but what is vulgarly received already.
154 J. S. MILL, A Letter from the Morning Chronicle of January 28, 1823, in PanFACE
TO LIBERTY 41 (B. Wishy ed. 1959):
For if you determine beforehand that opinions shall be promulgated only on one side
of the question, in whom will rest the power of determining which side shall be
chosen? The answer is, on those who are most enlightened and best qualified to
judge. But there are no determinable and universal marks by which wisdom is to be
known. To whom will you give the power of determining what men are the most
enlightened?
155 Z. CHAFEE, supra note 5, at 29: "The censor is the most dangerous of all the enemies
of liberty of the press, and ought not to exist in this country unless made necessary by extraordi-
nary perils." Id. at 520.
156 Emerson, supra note 143, at 658: No adequate study seems to have been made of the
psychology of licensers, censors, security officials, and their kind, but common experience is
sufficient to show that their attitudes, drives, emotions, and impulses all tend to carry them to
excesses. This is particularly true in the realm of obscenity, but it occurs in all areas where
officials are driven by fear or other emotion to suppress free communication.
157 See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v.
Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Superior Films
Inc., v. Dep't of Ed., 346 U.S. 587 (1954); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495
(1952); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290,
294 (1951) ; Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) ; Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946) ;
Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) ; Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939).
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The courts will never allow the censor to supervise the tastes of the reading or
listening public.
1 58
Judicial distrust of the censor lingers even after he has been legally stripped
of discretionary authority. The Supreme Court insists upon a rapid and inex-
pensive review by an independent judicial body subsequent to an adverse ruling
by the licensor. 5 This recognition that a right of procedural due process is
implicit within the first amendment imposes three requirements. First, the State
has both the burden of initiating a separate and independent review of its adverse
decisions and the burden of proving that the expression is unprotected by the
first amendment. 60 This necessitates an adversary procedure-with the usual
elements of procedural due process-before a judicial, not an administrative,
tribunal."' It requires the court to make a fresh determination of the merits of
the controversy unencumbered by the legal judgments of the licensing authorities.
In many cases this may require that the judicial body hear the case de nova, and
there is some argument that it may require a jury trial' 2 Second, the prior
restraint cannot be administered so as to place an anticipatory chill upon first
amendment rights by giving finality to the censor's decision. Therefore, any final
restraint on first amendment liberties prior to judicial review must be limited to
the preservation of the status quo and to the "shortest period compatible with
sound judicial resolution."1 3 Third, a prompt final judicial resolution must be
assured.26
4
By its recognition of a due process component within the first amendment,
the Supreme Court may appear unduly insensitive to the needs of the State to
implement its varied legitimate interests. Governmental authorities might forego
an attempt to prevent a substantial evil rather than resort to a judicial injunctive
procedure each time it denies a license. Nevertheless, procedural justice in a
court of law is central to the history of American freedom. Procedures lacking
158 Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 156 (1946).
159 Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51
(1965). See Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 489 (1973); Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S.
496 (1973); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 417 (1971); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photo-
graphs, 402 U.S. 363, 367 (1971); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 159 (1969)
(Harlan, J., concurring); Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968) ; Interstate Circuit,
Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690 n.22 (1968); Lee Art Theater v. Virginia, 392 U.S.
636 (1968); A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 208-13 (1964); Bantam Books,
Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 729-38
(1964); Collin v. Chicago Park Dist., 460 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1972). See also Monaghan,
First Amendment "Due Process," 83 Hazv. L. Rv. 518 (1970); Note, The Right to an Ad-
versary Hearing on the Issue of Obscenity Prior to the Seizure of Furtively Distributed Films,
69 MI H. L. Rav. 913 (1971). Many writers have suggested instances where an adversary
hearing would be mandatory prior to a final restraint by a censor. Monaghan, First Amend-
ment "Due Process," 83 HAav. L. R v. 518, 532-51 (1970); Note, Seizure of Allegedly Obscene
Films, 15 S.D.L. RPv. 399 (1970). Note, The Right to an Adversary Hearing on the Issue of
Obscenity Prior to the Seizure of Furtively Distributed Films, 69 MicH. L. Rav. 913, 922-23
(1971). However, the force of these arguments has been considerably weakened by the recent
case of Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973), where the notion of a right to an adversary
hearing prior to a final restraint by the censor was repudiated.
160 E.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
161 In Monaghan's article on first amendment due process he has an interesting discus-
sion on the merits of a judicial procedure over an administrative hearing. Supra note 159,
at 520.
162 Id. at 525-32.
163 E.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58, 59 (1965).
164 Id. at 59.
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the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression will chill first amendment rights
just as effectively as oppressive substantive rules. For example, when officials
seize allegedly obscene movie films pursuant to an ex parte order8 s or when
movie censors require time-consuming procedures in order to procure a license or
obtain judicial review, 68 the exhibitor will suffer financial loss and the public
will be precluded from viewing the film until these procedures have run their
course. The licensor of public speeches may similarly impede first amendment
rights by requiring lengthy procedures in license procurement and judicial
review. 7 As Mr. Justice Harlan aptly observed: "timing is the essence of
politics. It is almost impossible to predict the political future; and when an event
occurs, it is often necessary to have one's voice heard promptly if it is to be con-
sidered at all."' 5 In every case, timing is the essence of effective expression. At
every moment that a person is precluded from speaking solely by the order of an
inferior administrative official, constitutional rights are compromised."' 9
C. Application to the Institutionalized Resident
It is important to differentiate among the various forms of restrictions on
communication which exist in mental institutions. First, there are the indirect
restraints which suggest less severe first amendment problems. In this regard,
reasonable limitations on the hours, location, and form of visitation by friends or
relatives will likely be upheld, provided rational interests are promoted by the
regulation. Similarly, the requirement of a pass, the issuance of which is auto-
matic, for visitation by the resident outside the institution will not present
significant first amendment problems.
The institution will occasionally punish the resident because of the mere
fact of an utterance. This punishment will take the form of isolation, restriction
to closed wards, or deprivation of certain privileges. 7 ' This is clearly a direct
restraint and will be upheld only if the restriction on communication is necessary
to prevent a clear and imminent danger to the resident or another person.
Finally, there is the prior restraint utilized by the hospital psychiatrist in dis-
allowing mail, telephone, and visitation rights.' Here the psychiatrist acts as a
censor; on his unilateral authority, an individual's expressions are suppressed in
advance of their actual occurrence. The psychiatrist must be made to comply
with judicial principles governing prior restraints. Legislative standards precisely
165 See Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973); A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378
U.S. 205 (1964); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
166 See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); Freedman v. Maryland,
380 U.S. 51 (1965).
167 See Collin v. Chicago Park Dist., 460 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1972).
168 Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 163 (1969) (Harlan, J., con-
curring).
169 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 715 (1971) (Black, J., con-
curring).
170 See generally B. GOFFMAN, supra note 3, at 60-70; Ferleger, supra note 14, at 458-63.
171 Cf. Alberti v. Cruise, 383 F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1967) (In an action for malicious pros-
ecution and defamation of character the lower court enjoined the plaintiff from speaking or
writing to defendant or members of his family. "We think this . . . order is clearly a prior
restraint upon Mrs. Alberti's rights of freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment."
Id. at 272.)
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delineating permissible restriction of free expression must be promulgated to set
limits on psychiatric power. Moreover, in the rare case where the psychiatrist
must restrict the free expression of an individual patient, there should be a
separate and independent judicial review of the decision.
VI. The Overbreadth Doctrine and Its Application to the Institutionalized
Resident: A Third Level Analysis
A restriction on free communication which furthers an important interest
of the mental institution, such as public safety or rehabilitation, will nevertheless
be invalidated if its sweep is unnecessarily broad." 2 Although the interest may
be legitimate, and indeed substantial, 7" the means must be calculated so as to
effectuate only the precise governmental purpose. 74 A state hospital-working
from concrete standards of public safety or rehabilitation-may control the com-
municative behavior of an individual resident in a specific instance. For example,
a hospital administrator may point to a hypomanic and give a rational reason
for restricting first amendment rights in that particular case. However, a regula-
tion which proscribes unprotected communication is facially invalid if, by reason
of its scope, it might also curtail privileged utterance. If from a regulation
172 For the analogy to prisoner's rights, see Procunier v. Martinez, 94 S. Ct. 1800 (1974).
The censorship of prison mail is justified only if (1) the regulation furthers an important in-
terest unrelated to the suppression of expression, i.e., security, order, or rehabilitation, and (2)
the limits on first amendment freedoms are no greater than necessary or essential to the pro-
tection of the particular governmental interest involved.
173 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (The government interest in reducing
the threat of sabotage in defense plants was not insubstantial. Yet the means chosen to imple-
ment that government purpose was held unconstitutional as overbroad). But see Colten v.
Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 111 (1972) (The Court suggested that where the individual's interest
in expression is minuscule compared to the particular public interest in preventing such expres-
sion or conduct at that time and place, an overbreadth argument will fail.)
174 Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 24 (1968); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
438 (1963). See Parker v. Levy, 94 S. Ct. 2547 (1974); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601 (1973); Civil Service Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 601 (1973);
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967);
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-89
(1960), and cases cited therein; Tally v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Lovell v. Griffin,
303 U.S. 444 (1938). See also Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally
Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MIcH. L. Iv. 1107, 1145-51 (1972) ;
Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HAzv. L. REv. 844 (1970); Note, Civil
Disabilities and the First Amendment, 78 YALE, L.J. 842 (1969); Note, Less Drastic Means
and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969); Wormuth & Mirkin, The'Doctrine of
the Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L. Rav. 254, 267-93 (1964).
175 Jus tertii standing concepts usually apply in the area of constitutional law. A person
charged with the violation of a state regulation cannot assert the constitutional rights of an-
other. So long as the state regulation is constitutionally applied to the person charged, he
cannot be heard to say that the regulation, as applied to others, is unconstitutional. Broad-
rick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973), and cases cited therein. However, in the area
of the first amendment, the courts have allowed the individual charged to assert the uncon-
stitutionality of the regulation as applied to situations not before the court. E.g., Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972), and cases cited therein; N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 432 (1963), and cases cited therein. The policy behind this judicial decision is inextricably
bound to the preferred status of the first amendment and the fear that overbroad restrictions
will pose a "chilling effect" on privileged, as well as unprotected communication. Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 619-20 (1971)
(White, J., dissenting); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HAav. L. REv.
844, 852-58 (1970). Recently, the Court has moved slightly from this position in the first
amendment area. Instead of requiring strict "precision of legislation," N.A.A.C.P. v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963), it now only requires that the government enactment refrain from
"substantial" overbreadth. Parker v. Levy, 94 S. Ct. 2547 (1974):
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justifiable in a single case the administrator formulates a uniform policy of first
amendment restriction,' the regulation runs afoul of the Constitution. Such a
general restrictive policy represents a lowest common denominator theory of
mental hospital administration."' Under this theory, the hospital restricts
freedoms to the extent necessary for the well-being of its lowest functioning
resident. These restrictions form a general hospital policy applicable to all
residents even if they can exercise and benefit from greater freedoms. For
example, if one resident is harmed by delusional information sent in a letter by
the resident's paranoiac mother, the hospital not only reads and censors all future
letters sent to him (by his mother or anyone else), but also reads and censors
every letter sent to every resident as a general hospital policy.
When the government restricts communication it must do so within narrow,
objective, and definite standards, limiting its scope to those individuals who m the
policy must necessarily reach in order to achieve its purposes. A hospital policy
promulgated from a lowest common denominator framework does not strictly
correspond with the interests the State seeks to promote by its regulation. Such a
policy may be necessary to promote the rehabilitation of some residents, but the
restrictions also apply to others for whom they serve no habilitative purpose.
Moreover, a reasonable alternative exists to the lowest common denominator
policy. Any restriction necessary because of a clear and imminent danger to the
health of the resident can be justified in writing by the chief medical officer of
the hospital unit on the individual's hospital record." Mere entry into the hos-
pital should not dilute first amendment rights.
VII. Conclusion
In examining the right of the incarcerated mentally ill to communicate,
judicial attention has thus far focused on the statutory aspects of the right. 9 The
Thus, even if there are marginal applications in which a statute would infringe on
First Amendment values, facial invalidation is inappropriate if the "remainder of
the statute covers a whole range of easily identifiable and constitutionally proscribable
... conduct. . .
Id. at 2563.
176 See Muller, Involuntary Hospitalization, 9 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 187 (1968)
(Indignant protests arise when a former mental patient commits a crime. The result is a
restrictive custody policy even though it is not strictly necessary for the welfare of the public).
177 Defined as a minimum trait or characteristic shared by all members of a group. Placed
in the context of mental hospital administration, rules are geared to lowest level of com-
municative skill which is common to all residents. Therefore, if one person is hypomanic and
as a result cannot have free expression and association, the hospital allows no one to exercise
their rights of expression and association.
178 This alternative is in some ways similar to the Draft Act. A DRAFT ACT GOVERNING
HOSPITALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL. § 21, Public Health Publication No. 51 (rev. ed.
1952):
Right to communications and visitation . . (a) Subject to the general rules and
regulations of the hospital and except to the extent that the head of the hospital
determines that it is necessary for the medical welfare of the patient to impose
these restrictions, every patient shall be entitled (1) to communicate by sealed mail
or otherwise with persons, including official agencies, inside or outside the hos-
pital ....
179 Courts have focused on the statutory rights to free communication or habeas corpus and
not the first amendment right of free expression. See Stowers v. Wolodzko, 386 Mich. 119,
191 N.W.2d 355 (1971); Fhagen v. Miller, 65 Misc. 2d 163, 317 N.Y.S.2d 128 (Sup. Ct.
1970) (The Court had the opportunity to review a New York statute which limited a patient
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basis for many of these enactments is that communication is necessary to expose
cases of wrongful hospitalization. The statutory guarantee of correspondence and
visitation is thus often limited to named public officials or attorneys.'8s Simul-
taneously, where courts have vindicated the right to communicate, they have
limited their inquiry to the federal or state constitutional right of habeas corpus.""
This statutory and constitutional treatment of the resident's right to communicate
is unnecessarily limited in scope. It protects the resident's right to communicate
with his attorney or with officers of the state but does not protect against more
pervasive restrictions such as limitations of expression and association with friends
and relatives, as well as between residents of the opposite sex. A less restricted
reading of the first amendment would insure meaningful communication on a
broader front; it has been interpreted in other areas with an adaptability and a
sensitivity which should be extended to the problems encountered in mental
institutions.
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